By: Najib Izhar Wazir
Nearly Two decades long Afghan conflict has entered into a crucial domain. The corridors of policy makers in Islamabad feel a bit different situation across the western border to tackle with. Any formulation of state policy at this critical juncture needs new analysis, comparisons, interpretations and approaches. Pakistan being a natural affectee in any Afghan governmental setup had has always been ample opportunity to gain incredibly or lose in the same coin.
There are certain potential factors which will compel Islamabad to revise her approach towards Kabul. In the first place, Kabul has been under democratic regimes since 2001. Despite the question regarding the strength of this democratic structure, the seventeen years long democratic practices have empowered and embolden Afghan society in the domains of self determination, decision making, domestic and regional political understanding, social awareness and advanced administrative systems. The consecutive elections in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2014 have consistently added to the political consciousness of Afghan masses who now envisage a greater role in governmental machinery. This notion would resist any authoritarian, despotic, oligarchic or any other version of governmental structure that would deny the broader and grass-root participation of Afghan people.
Similarly, economic might in this 21st century is no more a mean to strategic superiority or decisive power but has emerged an end in herself. It has increased economic interdependency which has, by default, provided for reliable economic alternatives between states. Afghanistan, being a landlocked country, badly needs a stable economic structure smoothly backed by uninterrupted, safe and cost-efficient access to water. Due to the reason that Pakistan has long been switched to security centric approach rather than an economic one, causing rampant border closing, Afghanistan has tuned to other possibilities- notably, via Iran’s Chabahar port. It has not only reduced Pak-Afghan trade drastically but has also helped India to circumcircle Pakistan by undermining her life line – The CPEC.
In the same way, the expanding communication mediums in these days have deeply influenced policy and decision making. The hostilities of cyber, hybrid or any kind of this class of modern wars, have proven efficiently workable in poverty-stricken and less advanced regions of third World, nevertheless, it has potential to hurt the more sophisticated communities, for example, shadowing elections in America and Europe. Afghanistan, much vulnerable to this threat, has emerged as an unfortunate victim in this game of propagandas. Being a flashpoint of interests of her potential neighbors, Afghan minds are fed overwhelmingly with fabricated stories and events. India, with a huge number of social media clients, has designed this weapon as a key factor in her hostile state policy towards Pakistan. Similarly, these mediums are equally helpful for the state machineries in Pakistan to establish their soft power.
Formulation of any policy towards Afghanistan should ensure reliable and genuine economic advantages; greater political stability in consonance with the will of Afghan masses; a welfare and developmental plan to erect a soft power in Kabul and a regional and global support to Afghan cause. Pakistan needs to divert the public opinion of Afghan people toward her favor- a challenge requiring solid steps in the greater benefit of Kabul, a goal India is pursuing with promising results.
Pakistan can better use Chinese factor: working in a regional collaboration to make possible a durable political settlement and an economic structure relevant to the Chinese initiative of OBOR. In this connection, by connecting multiple trade routes along Durand Line with CPEC may not only benefit Pak-Afghan trade but may ease the economic crisis in newly merged tribal districts ensuring political stability, writ of state and distorting foreign propaganda wars.
Similarly, Pakistan should wisely use her political influence in Kabul peace settlement with two distinctions: absorbing it in the regional narrative of her allies and engineering it to fit in Afghan public opinion. Pakistan needs not to fight for a space in Kabul but to make herself inevitable to it.
The writer is Peshawar based political analyst, columnist and literary writer, he can be reached at najibizhar.engr@gmail.com